Robin on Tech

For sheer exasperation, it is usually hard to beat the experience of teaching an older relative how to use a PC. We’ve all done it. Concepts as (supposedly) simple as cut-and-paste or browser back-buttons can become fiendish puzzles in the hands and eyes of someone whose earliest experience of computation technology was the slide-rule.

Interestingly though, this experience is not consistent. Some of those users - who come to computers late in life - have little difficulty in picking up the basics and getting on with it. After a few informal lessons, they can be left to surf, email and even cut-and-paste, without anguished calls to their indentured technical support hotline.

It’s an interesting contrast. Some users need to be taught, often repeatedly, how to execute every action on their PC. They fear a disaster, or even the possibility of ‘breaking’ the computer if they get a step out of sequence or a click in the wrong place. They seem unable to apply the knowledge they acquired in one application in order to use it somewhere else. For example, after learning cut-and-paste in Microsoft Word, they have to relearn cut-and-paste in Internet Explorer or Outlook. For these users, everything about their PC is arbitrary. It must be learned by rote. If they can’t remember how to do a task, the task cannot be done.

There is a somewhat patronising view that these people are unable to pick up IT because they “didn’t grow up with computers”. Yet the experiences of older users who acquire their PC skills without a struggle puts pay to the notion that you can’t teach an old dog new tricks.

So why is there such a difference? Why do some users find it so easy, while others struggle with every step? It’s certainly not an intelligence issue. We all know smart people who exhibit the fearful behavior described above.

It all comes down to rules. The (usually unwritten) rules that govern how interfaces operate. The rules that are rarely taught explicitly. In particular, the rules which determine how we use a mouse.

On a Windows PC, the mouse is the most fundamental method of interaction with the operating system and its applications. It is surprising therefore that new users are rarely taught how to use the mouse. An instructor teaching a newbie might suggest “Left-click on that button. Right-click on that icon. Double-click on that application”. The instructor is telling the user what to do with the mouse, but is failing to impart how to use the mouse. Crucially, the rules are not being conveyed. The basic rules of mouse interaction are short and simple

• Left-click to make a selection (e.g. a link / button / tick-box / menu item)
• Right click to open a context-sensitive menu
• Double left-click to open an application or document from an explorer window

OK. Slightly different terminology might be used to explain these rules to a new user (for example avoiding jargon like ‘context-sensitive’). And of course there are plenty of variations and exceptions to the rules. But for the kind of things that most newbies are likely to attempt, these rules are fit-for-purpose.

The problem with the directive teaching style (”Left-click on this. Right click on that”) is that everything about human-computer interaction then appears arbitrary. The user is forced to devote excessive mental effort into ‘learning’ applications and ‘remembering’ the correct sequence of button-presses. As the instructor, you’ll know that things have gone wrong when you ask your newbie to “click on x” and are met with reply “right click or left click?”.

If the fundamentals of human-computer interaction are taught in a way that misleads new users into seeing them as arbitrary, we should not be surprised when those users surmise that everything else about their interaction with the PC is arbitrary. The absence of rules from the user’s understanding of computer interaction is the root cause of the paralysis which subsequently affects their attempts to learn new applications. It is the reason that we’re met with questions like “Do I right click or left click here?… If I press the wrong one will I delete something / break the pc?… I know you just explained this to me, but I’ve forgotten already”. A new user’s claim to have ‘forgotten’ how to do something is another indicator that things are being learned by rote rather than by rules.

Of course, as noted at the start of this article, not all new users are afflicted by these issues. Some have tutors who explain the rules from the start. Others figure out the rules for themselves, and quickly make the logical leap between remembering the correct sequence of button presses, and applying the rules of interaction.

This article has dealt mainly with the ‘rules’ for using a mouse. But computer user interfaces are filled with rules that we expect to be applied consistently. For example, when presented with a choice of radio-buttons, only one can be selected. But when presented with a choice of tick-boxes, several (or even all of them) can be ticked. In principle these rules are easier for new users to learn because they are composed of strictly visual elements: a tick-box is very obviously ticked or not ticked. The effect of the user’s interaction with the computer is visually immediate and logically deducible: “if I click on the tick-box again, it’ll become unticked”. However, if the user has failed to grasp the fundamental rules of mouse interaction, the consequence might be that they double-click on the tick-box, and then wonder why they can’t get the tick-box ‘ticked’.

A frequent example of this issue is the propensity of many people to unnecessarily double-click on links inside web browsers. They have failed to fully grasp the rules of mouse-based interaction. Fortunately, the penalty for this specific misunderstanding is pretty low: a link that has been double-clicked will open anyway.

Expert users may fail to appreciate the importance of the rules until they’re faced with learning a new application which provides an interface that breaks the rules or implements them in odd ways. Older versions of Photoshop and The Gimp (an opensource alternative to Photoshop) are good examples of this.

Students of usability might correctly recognise the ‘rules’ for mouse interaction as another expression of the concept of mental models. They might also see this as an example of the difference between implicit and explicit knowledge. Mental models are more commonly used to explain users’ understanding (or misunderstanding) of objects such as toasters, elevators and ovens. There isn’t space in this article for a full discussion of mental models. But what makes the mouse example so interesting is the pivotal role it plays in our IT skills, and the lack of attention it gets when attempting to impart those skills to other people. The ‘rules’ may indeed be hidden, but that shouldn’t and doesn’t detract from their significance.

The Register is one of the best-read and best-written IT sites. It carries plenty of news and analysis, and doesn’t bother hiding its opinions behind a rhetorical smokescreen of ‘balance’. A recently published rant entitled How the Mobile Phone Biz Lost the Plot is worth reading in full. The gist of the polemic is that in a rush to introduce glittering fripperies, the mobile phone manufacturers have lost sight of what’s important: simple interfaces, reliable operating systems, decent battery life and straightforward implementation of core functionality (i.e. making phonecalls and sending text messages).

Brendon McLean - the article’s author - raked over Nokia’s range of self-described “multimedia computer” handsts…

“The N-series must surely take the cake as the world’s most ill-conceived range of phones, being slower than treacle, as reliable as Windows 3.1 and clearly designed by a committee of unloved marketing droids”

Then, like a nostalgic grandparent, he harked back to the days when one Great British Pound would be enough to purchase ice-creams for the whole family, and still have enough left over to buy a three-bedroom semi in Hackney, by invoking the legendary Nokia 3210 as an example of the Right Way to design a handset.

“The 3210 is the Model T Ford of mobile phones. By 2000, the phone was cheap enough that almost anyone could afford it. Yet despite its affordability, it was packed with features not yet seen in the mass market; most of them market firsts. Among other things, it introduced internal aerials, T9 predictive text input, downloadable ringtones, downloadable operator logos and a user interface as easy to use as a doorbell.”

The praise for old-style handsets is fully justified. The Nokia 3210 was both simple and groundbreaking. And some of the denunciations hurled at modern models are equally valid. As the article points out, it is absurdly difficult to remove the SIM from modern Sony-Ericsson phones, and the operators do have a nasty habit of crippling key functionality. But the criticisms of modern handsets in general and the N-Series in particular are way off the mark. A cursory examination of many modern phones will reveal a panapoly of features that didn’t exist 10 years ago. From 3G data, to 3 megapixel cameras; from html browsers to GPS receivers, our handsets increasingly resemble pocket-computers. Fulminating against this remarkable integration of technology is rather like complaining that your PC is more complex and crash-prone than your abacus.

But here’s the rub. The spirit of the Nokia 3210 is still alive and very very strong. If you want an ultra-reliable handset with great battery life and a simple interface, then look at the Nokia 1100 which has shipped over 200 million units since 2003. A post on Engadget helpfully puts this astonishing figure into context by comparing it with the 100 million iPods, 50 million RAZRs, 10 million LG Chocolates and 115 million Playstation 2 consoles sold so far.

So, why have you probably never seen this remarkable handset? A search on Froogle (now unfortunately renamed Google Product Search) will reveal plenty of Nokia 1100 handsets available, plus its variants, the 1101 and the 1110. Other maufacturers also have similarly pared down (albeit less successful) handsets for sale. In fact, most sales of the world’s best-selling piece of consumer electronics have been into developing countries such as China. Meanwhile, richer Western consumers have generally gone for fancier models - like the Nokia N-Series, with their GPS receivers, megapixel cameras and “treacle” interfaces.

The point is that there is always a choice. Nobody is forced is to buy a flashy handset - although the salespeople in most retailers will invariably try to lead you in that direction. Looking back to the Nineties - as if it were some long-gone golden age of handset simplicity - is misleading and wrong. Today’s advanced handsets do have faults, some of which were accurately highlighted in McLean’s article. But McLean completely ignores the merits of choice and competition by heaping blame on the handset maufacturers for developing sophisticated handsets. He fails to acknowledge the benefits they bring, and then totally ignores the simpler contemporary models - whose predecessors he professes such admiration for.

For those who want it - and there are many - advanced handsets offer a richness of functionality that was unimaginable 10 years ago. Meanwhile, the world’s best selling mobile phone is simple, reliable, robust and available everywhere. 200 million consumers have realised this. Quite how it managed to pass by Brendon McLean is a bit of a mystery.

Giants always make for bigger targets. So it’s no surprise that Microsoft wears the biggest bullseye in the technology industry. From government regulators to competitors to website reviewers to ordinary end-users, it seems that everyone wants to legislate against, sue, criticise or just yell at the Beast of Redmond. And the brickbats are often justified. Microsoft has done some pretty daft things, from the crash-prone Windows Millenium Edition through to the absurdly named Windows Genuine Advantage (which offers absolutely no advantage, genuine or otherwise). And this site recently bashed Microsoft’s UMPC platform at some length.

But from time-to-time, the critics get it wrong. Whether they’re motivated by a zealous hatred of Microsoft and all its works or simply misinformed, some allegations just don’t stand up to scrutiny. And so it is with Microsoft Product Activation (MPA)

Microsoft has endured a lot of criticism since it first introduced MPA with some editions of Office 2000. MPA is now used on most Microsoft software, including its two cash-cows: Windows and Office. MPA requires the user to enter a unique code (usually printed on the CD packaging) during software installation. This code is then automatically compared against a list of codes on the Microsoft servers which then permit the use of the software (if it’s a legitimate code) or block use of the software (if Microsoft deems that the software has been pirated or installed too many times).

In order to mount a defence of such an unpopular copy-protection mechanism, it’s first necessary to examine the case against it. Criticisms of MPA can be broadly divided into three main arguments:

1. It is inconvenient.

• It requires the user to have their installation disc packaging handy when the software is first installed. If the hard disc is reformatted or replaced, the code needs to be entered again when the software is reinstalled.
• Online reactivation may be impossible if a PC is rebuilt with several new components (including a new motherboard), or if a user simply wants to migrate from an old PC to a new PC. In these circumstances, reactivation may only be possible via a phonecall to the MPA hotline. This issue can affect computer hardware enthusiasts who like to tinker with their PCs’ innards, or regular home users who have simply replaced an old machine with a new one.

2. It is an invasion of privacy.

• During product activation, information about the user’s PC is collected and sent back to Microsoft. The user cannot stipulate what information is collected, cannot see what information is collected, and cannot activate the product without allowing the information to be collected.

3. It doesn’t work. MPA does not prevent software piracy.

• None of the products supposedly protected by MPA - from Office 2000 through to Windows Vista - have survived determined attempts by technical experts to break the protection.
• There are a variety of methods for getting around MPA, from emulation tools to registry hacks, to downloadable key generators. Although the ease with which MPA can be circumvented varies from product to product, it is invariably possible assuming a determined and technically knowledgable user.

This article addresses each of these points. However, it is necessary to work from the premise that Microsoft’s desire to protect its software is legitimate in principle, even if its methods for doing so are disagreeable in practice. If one rejects that premise, then all other arguments regarding MPA are irrelevant.

Starting with the allegation that it is inconvenient. Most software packages from most software companies require the user to enter a security code when the program is first installed. As there are few complaints about entering codes for most non-Microsoft products, there must be something special about the way that Microsoft does it. And indeed there is. On most non-Microsoft programs, the software installer hashes the security code locally (i.e. on the user’s own PC) to ensure its validity. MPA works differently, in that it connects to Microsoft’s servers to check the validity of the code and ensure that the same code has not been used too many times.

Consequently, if the software is installed on a replacement PC or the motherboard is switched, the user might have to call the Microsoft hotline for a replacement code. This is the thing that critics complain about. Indeed an article on The Inquirer rages against the injustice of it…

“Mr and Mrs Hardworkingperson have an old PC with XP and Office 2003 installed. They’ve had it for five years. Junior Hardworkingperson wants to run a new game that only works under Vista, so Mr and Mrs H pop down to PCs R Us for a new machine. This comes with Vista pre-installed, but without Office… Any attempt to reinstall it will result in a message telling them they’ve exceed the maximum number of installs and force them to phone up for a new product code. They’re branded as criminals for buying a new machine.”

That kind of article - on one of most-read IT news sites - is typical of the hysterical attitude of many MPA critics. The family in the story are not being branded as criminals. They’re simply being asked to call a Microsoft hotline - which is available 24/7 - so that they can be given a new code. Indeed, even the article’s author then admits…

“To be fair, the MS product activation call centre appears to be staffed by halfway-decent, intelligent people, but that’s not the point.”

Actually, it is the point. Microsoft are protecting their software and doing it in a pretty painless way. One phonecall is a fairly trivial requirement compared to the rest of the onerous process of configuring a new PC. And crucially, the author conveniently omits the long grace period - during which the software can be used as normal - before it has to be reactivated. Reactivation does not have to be done immediately. In fact, the software can be used 50 times before activation.

Moreover, it is worth considering that this issue only affects the tiny proportion of consumers who upgrade their motherboard - an activity which is beyond the capacity of all but the most expert users; and those users who upgrade to a new PC and then want to reinstall the old software. Microsoft’s own research indicates that activation requests due to modified or new hardware account for just 2% of the total. And the chances of having to call the hotline are now even lower, as the new Office 2007 Home & Student edition permits installation on 3 different PCs.

Moving on to the allegation that MPA is an invasion of privacy. This criticism would be easier to take seriously if it wasn’t so patently untrue. MPA sends two pieces of data to Microsoft: the activation code, and a hardware ‘hash’ code.

• The activation code is simply the line of digits printed on the CD packaging.

• The ‘hash’ code is a non-unique number generated by the specific hardware configuration inside the user’s PC. It cannot be ‘reverse-engineered’ i.e. it is impossible for Microsoft to know the make or model of your PC - nor indeed anything about it at all - by looking at the hash code.

Neither the activation code, nor the hash code is linked to a specific person. No personal information is collected. No information about about any aspect of the PC is collected. Microsoft knows nothing at all about the user or the user’s PC. There is simply no invasion of privacy.

The final allegation is undoubtedly the most serious. If MPA fails to prevent piracy, then what’s the point of having it at all? As noted above, with sufficient determination and expertise there are a variety of ways to ‘crack’ MPA. In fact, Microsoft recently commented on a BIOS hack that breaks MPA on specific editions of Windows Vista.

However, it is misleading to conclude that MPA is a failure just because it’s vulnerable to sophisticated attacks. Indeed, criticising MPA because it can be broken with a BIOS hack, is analagous to criticising a door lock for failing to resist a master safecracker. MPA is not designed to prevent circumvention by individual users with sufficent expertise, motivation and time to spare. Rather, it is intended to hamper organised counterfeiters, and casual piracy amongst friends and relatives. In reference to the BIOS hack, a Microsoft Senior Product Manager commented…

“Our goal isn’t to stop every “mad scientist” that’s on a mission to hack Windows.”

On every form of digitial media, from DVDs to iTunes, all copy-protection mechanisms have eventually been broken. Does anyone really think that Microsoft engineers thought that MPA would be different? Does anyone suspect that it was a galloping shock when MPA turned out not to be impregnable? Of course not. MPA may not prevent the most knowledgable and determined users from pirating software, but it certainly prevents enough to make it worthwhile.

So, what can be concluded about MPA? It is of little or no inconvenience to at least 98% of users. It does not breach anyone’s privacy. And, rather like a door lock, while it’s not unbreakable, it does a good enough job in most circumstances to make it worth having. Who could argue with that?

A geeky prospect it may be, but it’s often fun to imagine the product development meetings which occurred to produce some of the services and solutions we’re most reliant on. Not necessarily the most common solution. Rather, the products which, through sheer innovation, defined, or redefined a whole product area.

For many technology companies, ‘innovation’ is just a throwaway buzzword to be inserted with requisite regularity into puff marketing brochures and website flash animations. But occasionally, new products tip up, fully deserving of the ‘innovative’ moniker, and it is these products whose genesis is worth considering.

For example, consider the questions Google engineers might have asked themselves when they started specifying the requirements for a Google email product.

• What do we like about current email implementations?

• What do we dislike?

• What would do we want to do but are prevented from doing? How do current systems limit us?

To an extent, Gmail redefined email by adding pseudo-limitless storage, and doing away with folders. Most other email providers were forced to increase their storage quotas, and introduce email ‘tagging’. But the Google engineers omitted a key ingredient: email’s best kept secret.

Gmail’s web interface is one of the best around, but for speed, efficiency and flexibility it doesn’t come close to matching Outlook, Thunderbird or any number of other desktop email clients. It’s here that most webmail providers hit a problem. If you use a webmail account with an email client, or want to access your email from multiple locations or multiple devices, it becomes very difficult to keep your folders synchronised. The reason for this problem is the Post Office Protocol (POP or POP3) which underpins most consumer and many business email infrastructures.

If you’ve ever been approached by a friend or relative in the middle of an email ‘disaster’ – then POP was almost certainly the culprit. Getting a new laptop and can’t work out to how to ‘move’ all the old mail on to the new machine? Blame POP. Been accessing email from several different places, and now ‘sent’ mails are missing from the ‘Sent’ folder? Blame POP. Your laptop has been stolen – and now years of archived emails are gone forever? Blame POP (and the thieves…) Emails that are available on one PC can’t be seen on another PC? Blame POP.

It’s astonishing how many email problems are caused by POP. When POP was originally specified, users were expected to access their emails via dial-up, from one place and one device. The concept of always-on internet and multiple login locations was never envisioned. Neither was the idea that we might be strolling around accessing our email from mobile devices.

POP works by storing all incoming emails on a server until the user logs in to read them with an email client. At that point, the emails are moved from the server on to the user’s PC. Outgoing emails are stored in a ‘Sent’ folder in the client on the user’s PC.

The problem comes when the user wants to access emails from a second PC (or any other device). All the old emails have been stored locally on the first PC – but not kept on the server, which means that they’re unavailable on the second device. Worse still, email received or sent on the second PC will be stored locally i.e. on the second PC (so it won’t be available on the first PC). Over time, all the PCs and devices become out-of-sync. Even if the user stick to using only one PC, everything will still be lost if the PC breaks or is stolen.

To get around these problems, a number of updates and ‘fixes’ (which would be better described as kludges) have been applied to POP. A ‘Leave on server’ option copies incoming emails onto the local drive rather than moving them. However, for reasons too lengthy to explain here, the ‘Leave on server’ kludge is not totally reliable, and forces the server and client to do a lot of unnecessary work in the background.

POP suffers a myriad of other inefficiencies and problems. For example…

• The email client is forced to download whole emails (including attachments) before the user can read them. It is not possible for the user to simply view the header, and then decide whether to download the rest of the message.

• It is not possible to reliably log into a single account from multiple devices simultaneously (rendering it impossible, for example, to retrieve email on a mobile handset while still logged in on a PC)

• It is difficult to manage folders (e.g. renaming, creating and deleting) on the server by using the client.

Fortunately, a solution to all these problems has been around for years. It’s an alternative to POP, called IMAP, and avoids all the issues which plague POP.

• Emails are never moved or copied on to the local PC. Instead, they stay on the server at all times. When an email is sent, a copy is stored in the ‘Sent’ folder on the server. When an email is received, it is viewed on the local device, but remains on the server.

• When the user logs in, only the email headers are downloaded. The body of each email (along with any attachments) is only opened when the user opens the email. No time is wasted while waiting for unwanted emails or spam to download.

• A single email account can be accessed from many locations and devices - even simultaneously - without any folders becoming out-of-sync.

• Folders can be managed directly from the client

• IMAP supports ‘push’ functionality so users are immediately notified when a new email arrives. There is no need for the client to constantly ‘poll’ the server.

This might seem too-good-to-be-true. Indeed, the most significant downside to IMAP is that it requires a degree of server speed and reliability (on the part of the email service provider) that wouldn’t be necessary for a POP account. Consequently, most consumer IMAP email providers are not free. I’ve used Fastmail for several years and am happy to pay $40 a year for their premium service. For alternatives, there’s a hugely detailed list of IMAP providers here.

A little Googling will reveal that IMAP has many devotees. Those who have discovered it, like to shout about it. It’s not surprising that IMAP access is the single most requested GMail feature. And there are plenty of articles (e.g. here, here and here) extolling its virtues. Even Microsoft Exchange Server supports it. Inexplicably, IMAP is still email’s best kept secret. Hopefully it won’t be for much longer.

In a previous post, I wrote that Apple’s iPhone is significant because it is the first truly data-centric phone to be aimed at consumers rather than business. The crucial thing about Apple’s strategy is their perception of the network operator - Cingular - as nothing more than a ‘pipe’ for voice and data. An interesting article in the Wall Street Journal has thrown some more light on this idea…

“Service providers usually hold enormous sway over how phones are developed and marketed — controlling every detail from processing power to the various features that come with the phone. Not so with Apple and Cingular… Cingular agreed to leave its brand off the body of the phone. Upsetting some Cingular insiders, it also abandoned its usual insistence that phone makers carry its software for Web surfing, ringtones and other services…”

“Mr. Jobs once referred to telecom operators as “orifices” that other companies, including phone makers, must go through to reach consumers. While meeting with Cingular and other wireless operators he often reminded them of his view, dismissing them as commodities and telling them that they would never understand the Web and entertainment industry the way Apple did”

The crucial point is that Apple knows that the networks don’t ‘get’ consumer data. Intead of seeing data as a valuable commodity - to be sold in great volume to as many customers as possible - the operators have tried to ration it, charge ludicrous prices and endlessly attempted to bundle their own content. Many consumers have been put off from using significant quantities of mobile data because of the operators’ interminable bungling:

• It has been much too expensive. For example, Orange UK’s ‘cheapest’ mobile data bundle is still £4 per month for 4mb…

• The tariffs have been opaque. Consumers have been unsure what they’re going to be billed for, and how much it would cost them. And because they perceive mobile data as expensive to begin with, they’ve been deterred from using it at all.

• The operators have created ‘walled gardens‘ and/or attempted to funnel traffic through their own WAP sites (e.g. Orange World). Most consumers aren’t savvy enough (or just can’t be bothered) to modify their mobile browser homepage. So for many users, an unedifying mobile data experience has begun and ended in the walled gardens of their own networks.

• The operators have concentrated on trying to sell their own content (e.g. ringtones and wallpapers) instead of promoting wider access to the web and email.

• The operators have crippled or impaired the data-capabilities of many handsets. For example, Orange completely disabled the Nokia Standby Screen (which provides convenient access to email) on many of it’s phones, and replaced it with the Orange Homescreen. Although the Orange Homscreen can now be switched off on newer handsets, the setting is buried in the configuration menu, so many users never discover it.

Until recently, the effect of these policies has been to drive customers away from using significant quantities of mobile data. The result of this self-inflicted failure to capitalise on their expensive 3G spectrum is that many operators have been forced to write down the value of those licenses.

Fortunately, things are starting to change. T-Mobile have led the way with their ‘Web ‘n’ Walk’ data bundles. Three have introduced the ‘X-Series’ mobile data package. And even Orange provides an (unpromoted) 1gb data bundle for £8 per month, providing you spend enough on voicecalls.

Jobs’ reference to operators as “orifices” may have been gratuitous, but it was not inaccurate. iPhone owners are going to be using far greater quantities of data than most owners of other consumer handsets. This might be partially attributable to the fact that the type of people who will own iPhones are the type of people who would use more data anyway. But, as I explained in a previous post the real reason is that Apple have created a phone which really makes mobile data a compelling proposition. Coupling easy-to-access, useful data-services with a cheap data tariff will persuade customers to use - and spend more on - data. The lower margins on mobile data will be vastly outweighed by the huge jump in volume.

Recent leaks suggests that Apple may not be the only new entrant to the handset manufacturing business. Google is apparently working on an interesting ‘Google Phone’ - which will similarly use the network operators as nothing more than “dumb pipes“.

At last, mobile data is becoming the commodity it always should have been, with the mobile operators acting only as pipes. The deal with Apple indicates Cingular’s tacit acceptance of its role as an “orifice” (or at least a ‘dumb pipe’!), not as a content provider. Few customers view their broadband ISP as anything other than a ‘pipe’ with which to access the internet. It’s about time that more mobile network operators allowed their subscribers to take the same view.

Regular readers of this blog will know that debunking faddish technologies is a frequent activity around here. Continuing in that vein, the recently launched Nokia N77 showcases another example of clever but ultimately useless mobile functionality.

The N77’s ‘killer feature’ is the integration of a DVB-H mobile TV tuner. In addition to all the usual functionality we expect from a Nokia N-Series phone, this one will allow the user to watch TV on-the-move, without incurring huge data-charges. And yet scant attention is paid to the context-of-use issues that will plague mobile TV, rendering it no more than a novelty add-on.

‘Context-of-use issues’ are factors specifically relating to the situation or circumstances in which a technology is used. These can significantly affect the choice to use one technology over another, or the way in which a technology is used. Mobile phones - due to their omnipresence in our lives, and their versatile range of functionality - are affected by context-of-use issues more than any other technology. For example, when one is in a meeting and silent or discreet communication is required, text messaging is usually preferred over a voice call. In that situation, social and professional norms are the context-of-use issue. Similarly, in a loud environment (such as a rock concert), ambient noise becomes a context-of-use issue. Again, the user would probably choose text-messaging over voice-calling.

The key to understanding why context-of-use issues are so important is to consider where and why somebody would elect to use a particularly technology. In doing so, it soon becomes clear what a dramatic effect context-of-use can have on the frequency with which a technology is used, and with it, the potential profitability. Mobile TV is a brilliant example of this.

Let us consider where someone might want to watch mobile TV.

• It’s unlikely to be useful in the home, where most people already have access to large TVs.

• Most people don’t have access to TVs in their offices or workplaces, but then most people don’t have jobs in which it would be practical, acceptable or appropriate to watch TV on a mobile phone. And even if they could get away with it for short periods, it would be easier and more comfortable to watch content on their PC than a phone.

• Hotel rooms invariably have their own TVs, so there would be little to be gained there either.

• While socialising or undertaking leisure activities it’s (hopefully) safe to assume that the user would either be too distracted by other things to watch TV; or simply too embarrassed to be caught watching TV instead of talking with friends.

Maybe mobile TV is intended for use ‘out-and-about’ or for filling periods of ‘dead’ time (e.g. while travelling). It goes without saying that there will no reception while flying or taking underground trains. It might be possible to watch while taking an overground train. But the all-too-common problem of dropped voice-calls should be enough to convince anyone that constantly losing sound and pictures while going through a tunnel or an area of poor reception would result in a pretty unrewarding viewing experience.

An iPod or any other digital audio player allows the user to listen to music whilst doing something else, and often makes that ’something else’ a more pleasant experience e.g. jogging. This is not true of mobile TV. It is not possible to watch mobile TV while walking around, working at a desk, carrying bags, exercising or really doing anything which requires hands or eyes.

There is also the issue of sound. Most users would want to listen through earphones. However, there are very few handsets which incorporate the standard 3.5mm headphone socket. Instead, most handsets use proprietary headphone interfaces or a 2.5mm socket. This limits users to the (generally abysmal) earphones which are bundled with handsets by manufacturers. If the user has an iPod (or any other audio player), two different pairs of headphones would need to be carried around: one pair for the phone, and one pair for the iPod.

So, for mobile TV to be useful, all of the following would have to occur simultaneously: The user would have to be: on the ground; in an area of good reception; carrying the proprietary headphones; not at home; not at the office; not in a hotel; not walking or running; not carrying anything; not socialising or talking to other people, and not undertaking any other task or activity which requires the use of eyes or hands.

In a procession of daft technologies, mobile TV would be pretty near the front.

It’s a fairly banal truism that when Apple launches a new gadget, a lot of people get very excited.

Most of the news coverage of Apple’s iPhone dealt with the somewhat underwhelming technical specs and the innovative interface. However, the really interesting part was barely covered until a few weeks later: the backstory of how Cingular ended up inking a deal with Steve Jobs to become the exclusive carrier for Apple’s new gadget. And why Verizon - Apple’s first-choice carrier - turned it down.

Jim Gerace, a Verizon VP was quoted as saying “We said no. We have nothing bad to say about the Apple iPhone. We just couldn’t reach a deal that was mutually beneficial”. Apparently, the major sticking points were that Apple wanted a cut of each subscriber’s monthly bill while retaining control over how and where the phones could be sold.

It is understandable that Verizon would find these conditions problematic. No other cellphone manufacturer is allowed to take a direct cut of subscriber revenues, nor to dictate how their phones should be sold. Verizon may have felt that it would be setting a terrible precedent if it capitulated to Apple’s demands.

However, there is a lot more to this than might be initially apparent. Significantly, handset manufacturers do already take a cut of subscriber revenues - but they do so indirectly - via handset subsidies. Many consumers demand a new handset every year. All operators heavily subsidise handsets (or even give them away free) as a way of reducing churn and enticing new customers. While the size of the subsidy varies depending on the price of the handset and the monthly spend of the customer, it still constitutes a significant chunk of revenues. If the networks didn’t subsidise the handsets, the manufacturers’ sales figures would go through the floor. Thus the network operators are already (in effect) giving a big chunk of each subscriber’ tariff to the handset manufacturer.

Apple’s plan is to sell the handsets with little or no subsidy (at $599, the 8gb iPhone would be the most wallet-busting mainstream handset available) and to take a cut of operator revenues instead. Of course, one of the most salient points in this discussion is how much of a cut Apple have managed to wangle from Cingular’s grasp. That information is presently a secret. But it means that Cingular avoids taking a hit when the handset is purchased because it is no longer subsidised. Instead, Cingular ends up sending a portion of its revenue to Apple, depending on how much the customer spends on voice and data.

This leads on directly to a broader point: the real significance of the iPhone’s new interface.

It is always risky to comment on the details of a device which one hasn’t used, isn’t yet available and for which few hands-on reviews exist. Nevertheless, from the demonstrations and information Apple has made available, it is apparent that the iPhone has an innovative and easy-to-use interface.

In addition to voice calling, the iPhone puts useful data services front-and-centre in a way which other manufacturers and network operators have previously failed to do on consumer devices. As a case-study of how not to do it, there is no better example than the disasterous campaign launched by British network operator Three - which heavily promoted its video-calling service as a USP. By heavily pushing a consumer service that consumers really weren’t interested in (and were even less interested in paying for) Three failed to attract subscribers and simultaneously tarnished their brand. Of course, this is just one example, but there are countless others. Having paid through the nose for their 3G licenses, the UK operators have conspicuously failed to monetise them by failing to realise their own projections of vast consumer data revenues.

The iPhone could allow them to buck the trend. Examine the picture below.

There are 15 buttons on the screen, of which 5 are data services (Stocks, Maps, Weather, Mail, Web). Crucially, the icons and choice of nomenclature accurately ‘describe’ the services they link to. This compares well with many other handsets, which routinely describe web/wap access as ‘Services’ and use low-resolution, poorly defined iconography. The weak iconography is often compounded by the operators’ ham-fisted attempts to plaster their own branding - or worse - their own interface on top (check out the awful Orange Homescreen for another example). Apple’s insistence on maintaining control over the handset should prevent the operators from destroying the iPhone’s elegant navigation and look-and-feel.

Everything that has been seen so far suggests that uniquely, Apple has produced a very data-centric handset aimed at the consumer market. The quality of the interface is significant because it can affect how much consumers use their handsets each month, and with it how much they spend each month (the ‘Average Revenue Per User’ or ARPU). By providing an elegant interface and a simplified setup, Apple is indirectly encouraging users to spend more by using data services more frequently. This is likely to see more customers signing up for ‘unlimited’ data plans (e.g. T-Mobile’s Web ‘n’ Walk) or using more pay-as-you-go data on existing tariffs.

The idea that if you make something easier to use, people will use if more frequently is rooted in both common sense and empirical evidence. Nokia is a good example of this, as their handsets are frequently perceived as being easier to use than many of their competitors and they usually lead ARPU research findings.

• In their 2002 mobile report, Continental Research showed the average Nokia user spends £22.06 per month; making 15 voice calls and sending 18 text messages each week. This contrasts with an average of all the other handsets manufacturers, whose users spend a mean of £15.14 per month; making 11 voice calls and sending 10 text messages each week.

• Nokia’s own 2006 study had 30,000 respondents across 6 European countries. The three highest ARPU generating 3G handsets were all from Nokia.

Of course, correlation does not equal causation. There are potentially other signficant variables such as age. It would be difficult to prove definitively that Nokia’s ARPU advantage is derived solely from its superior user interface. However, the Director of Continental Research suggests usability may be significant – “handset functionality may also encourage greater usage. If it is easier to use a phone it may stimulate calling and usage of text messages.”

So, Apple is launching a device which should significantly raise the consumption of mobile data amongst those who own the iPhone. This should raise ARPUs, and benefit the network operators. This brings us back to Verizon. Should Verizon have embraced Steve Jobs’ offer? Did they screw up by saying ‘no’? It all depends on the cut the man from Cupertino was asking for. And that it is likely to remain a secret for the forseeable future.

In the mean time, we can only wait to see if the iPhone fulfills its promise to the operators as well as to consumers.

The codenames assigned to products under development are usually meaningless. As a case-in-point, AMD went through a phase of naming its CPUs after horses, and Intel has traditionally favoured rivers.

So, Microsoft’s choice - about a year ago - of Origami as a development codename name for the Ultra Mobile PC (UMPC) might have been par for the course. Afterall, it clearly doesn’t fold, sprout a tail, or bear any resemblance to a swan. In two respects though, the UMPC is ultimately very close to its moniker: it is pretty but quite useless.

The UMPC is far too bulky to fit in a pocket, so users have to carry it in a bag. It lacks a keyboard, so emailing, word processing and anything which requires sustained data entry are all out of the question. It runs a full-blown copy of Windows XP. XP is a fine operating system, but is pretty impractical at anything below 1024 x 768. The native vertical resolution of various UMPCs is far too small – even to fit some dialogue boxes on the screen. And, on most units, the battery gives out after less than three hours.

So, here we have a device which accomplishes far less than a decent (and pocketable) Windows Mobile device (check out the HTC TyTn for an example of the way it should be done) or an ultra-portable laptop.

• It cannot be easily used for office tasks. Of course, it’s possible to purchase and carry around a compact USB keyboard. But then why not buy an ultra portable laptop and benefit from its larger, higher resolution screen; comfy keyboard and ‘proper’ Windows experience?

• It cannot be used as an effective media player - as it’s far too big and the battery life is far too short.

• It cannot be used for 3D gaming - due to the absence of a decent graphic accelerator

• It’s fairly impractical for web-browsing ‘on-the-go’ as most UMPCs incorporate wi-fi but not 3G

As it’s no good for serious tasks and no good for having fun, who did Microsoft imagine would use this thing? In large usability and information architecture projects, I’m sometimes asked to produce a ‘personas’ document. This is a list of partially fictionalised users (based on real customers). Each user is described, along with their needs, priorities and objectives in relation to the product. Each persona is named, and may even be referred to affectionately during the project, along the lines of “Would Fiona cope with this dialogue box?” or “Is this flexible enough for Ted?” We try to ensure that the full spectrum of users - from the least sophisticated to the most technically adept - are catered for by the product.

The trouble with the UMPC is that it’s difficult to conceive of any situation in which other devices - namely ultra-portable laptops or Windows Mobile devices – couldn’t provide the same functionality more effectively, more conveniently and often at less expense. Can I imagine Ted or Fiona using this device? No.

After nearly a year of poor sales, it appears that the industry still hasn’t learnt its lesson. Instead of abandoning the concept, recent leaks and announcements suggest that Microsoft and its partners are going to have another go. We’re being promised smaller, lighter, less battery-hungry devices and pseudo-UMPCs running on Windows Mobile with keyboards.

Switching to Windows Mobile would definitely be a positive development: running Windows XP on a tiny screen was a daft decision from the get-go. Improving the battery-life and reducing the overall form-factor are obvious Good Things. Unfortunately, it still leaves a device which simply won’t fit inside a jacket pocket, let alone a trouser pocket. It’s too large to carry around everywhere, but too small and too hobbled to work on efficiently. In effect, it falls awkwardly between two established form factors, acquiring none of the positive points of either platform, but suffering all the deficiencies of both.

So, the questions remain. If users already own an ultra-portable laptop or a pocketable Windows Mobile device, why would they purchase a UMPC? If users don’t own an ultra-portable laptop or a pocketable Windows Mobile device, why would they purchase a UMPC? I can’t find an answer to either of those questions.

Rather like the Tablet PC line that preceded it, the UMPC is ultimately doomed. It is a product in search of market that does not exist. One can only wonder how many years of poor sales and badly received product iterations Microsoft and its partners will have to go through before they finally give up on this wretched concept.

Everyone loves a prize fight. And many commentators love analogies: the sillier the better. So the ‘war’ between the two next generation DVD formats – Blu-Ray and HD-DVD - has had many commentators falling over themselves in breathless anticipation of the ‘battle’ as the two ‘competitors’ slug it out for our cash. And of course, a tiresome slew of identical (and identically silly) analogies has followed, as comparison is made with 1980s ‘battle-to-the-death’ between VHS and Betamax for the home videotape market.

The theme underlying most of these articles is that “the consumer will lose out”. The conventional wisdom goes as follows. Consumers will unwittingly purchase overpriced players that will only play content from the movie studios which happen to have signed deals with the relevant ‘side’. Consumers will then be unable to play any content from the ‘other side’. Worse still, one side may come to dominate the market, leaving the other one a dismal failure – a la Betamax – and leave millions of consumers stranded with expensive but obsolete players.

Fortunately, that kind of forecast is wrong on every level. It’s predicated on two false assumptions

• It assumes that consumers are both ignorant and stupid

• It assumes that hardware manufacturers and content providers will endlessly put politics and pride ahead of making money.

And it ignores some pretty salient facts:

• Most consumers are happy with the current DVD standard and are in no particular hurry to upgrade. They’re willing to wait for prices to drop, especially as the advantages of next-gen DVDs are much slimmer than the benefits of, for example, DVD against VHS or CD against audio cassette.

• For all intents and purposes, HD-DVD and Blu-Ray present identical value propositions i.e. they’re equally good, but they’re also equally incompatible and equally expensive. As neither is better than the other, there’s nothing to persuade consumers to pick one over the other (apart from slick marketing).

HD-DVD and Blu-Ray players are expensive right now. If we’ve learnt anything from our experiences of first generation DVD players, it’s that few standalone players (i.e. excluding the PS3) will be sold until the price drops below £200. This is unlikely to happen until 2008, at which time dual-format players (i.e. compatible with both formats) will be hitting the market at similarly affordable prices. LG’s dual-format player was the first out of the gate, but at $1,199 it’s hardly a commoditised device yet.

In other words, most consumers are likely to ignore next-gen DVDs throughout 2007 because the players are too expensive and widespread media coverage has highlighted the compatibility issues. But 2008 will see prices plummet and dual-format players become the norm (because most consumers simply won’t accept a device which only plays half the available content).

Meanwhile, the movie studios would never accept a situation in which they knowingly and deliberately froze themselves out of half the potential market. Fortunately, they also know that affordable dual-mode players are on the way, and can safely cut deals with whichever side it’s politically expedient to do so.

The only real question is whether the technology ‘champions’ for Blu-Ray and HD-DVD (Sony and Toshiba respectively) will produce dual-format players of their own, or continue making single-format standalone players that no-one will want to buy.

Sadly for sports fans (and anyone who enjoys the analogy) we’re unlikely to witness a real prize-fight. Instead, it’ll be more like a prolonged stare-a-thon, as each side gazes menacingly at the other, and everyone else just gets on with business.